

e i s o d o s

Zeitschrift für
Antike Literatur und Theorie

2022 (2) Herbst

e i s o d o s – Zeitschrift für Antike Literatur und Theorie

Herausgegeben von Bettina Bohle

Erscheinungsort: Gießen

ISSN: 2364-4397

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Das **eisodos**-Titelbild zeigt einen Ausschnitt aus der Handschrift Par. gr. 1807 von Platons *Politeia*, in welchem der Schweinestaat erwähnt wird. Quelle: Source gallica.bnf.fr / Bibliothèque nationale de France

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VORWORT DER HERAUSGEBERIN

Liebe **eisodos**-Leser*innen,

Krisen und Konflikte dieser Tage lassen auch die Redaktionsprozesse von **eisodos** nicht unberührt. Dies und die hauseigene Umstrukturierung lassen erst langsam wieder eine gewisse Normalität einkehren. Organisatorisch war ein Interview für diese Ausgabe nicht zu bewerkstelligen. Eine Freude sind dagegen die vielen Einreichungen, die uns erreichen und deren Früchte hier nach und nach erscheinen werden.

In dieser Herbstausgabe erscheint ein Artikel zu Platons sogenanntem ‚Schweinestaat‘ von Benny Kozian, der inzwischen als Redaktionsassistent die Zeitschrift unterstützt. Die Unabhängigkeit des Begutachtungsprozesses seines Artikels wurde durch eine komplett externe Redaktion gewährleistet. Außerdem erscheint mit dieser Ausgabe eine Rezension von Johannes Groß zu Aniela Knoblichs Buch *Antikenkonfigurationen in der deutschsprachigen Lyrik nach 1990*.

Ferner sind wir schon eifrig mit der Vorbereitung einer Sonderausgabe von **eisodos** beschäftigt, die von **eisodos**-Autorin Sophie Emilia Seidler (Frühling 2017) als Gastredakteurin herausgegeben wird und Texte zu feministischen und machtkritischen Deutungen antiker Mythen versammelt; diese Sonderausgabe wird 2023 erscheinen.

Auf alle diese Projekte freuen wir uns und wünschen nun eine gute Lektüre der Herbstausgabe 2022 von **eisodos**.

Wir danken unseren Helfer*innen im Hintergrund, Gisela Bohle und Rebecca Bohle fürs Korrektorat, Martin Weigert für die Hilfe beim LaTeX-Satz sowie insbesondere auch dem Beirat und den Gutachtenden für ihre wissenschaftliche Begleitung der Zeitschrift.

Die Herausgeberin
Bettina Bohle
und Redaktionsassistent
Benny Kozian

SOCRATES' EXHORTATION TO THE "CITY OF PIGS"

*... and why nobody follows**

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1. Introduction

This essay shall attempt to render plausible an interpretation concerning the so-called "City of Pigs" (ὄσων πόλις; Pl. *rep.* 372a3–373b1)¹ that is free of the difficulties I have encountered in previous research on this passage. So far, a wide range of interpretations has been proposed: from a (pre)historic reading of a lost Golden Age² to a comparative-structural reading, seeing the "City of Pigs" as a worse, parodic or even more appropriate vision of an Ideal State.³ Some claim that the state as part of a more far-reaching evolution is developing and incomplete,⁴ whereas others maintain its completeness as an independently existing state.⁵ Usually, a particular emphasis is placed on the negative assessment of the "City of Pigs".⁶ Some interpretations try to explain the role of the "City of Pigs" speculatively appealing to other arguments within the *Politeia*.⁷ I shall question these interpretations and derive *from the passage itself* the hypothesis that (a) Plato, by introducing the "City of Pigs", metaphorically proposes an *economic system* in terms of human needs, that (b) the label "City of Pigs" is only *one*, purely ironical assessment of it, whereas (c) in the passage the preference is subtly given to

* I would like to thank Prof. Dr. Christian Brockmann and the two anonymous referees of *eisodos* for their helpful comments on this article. The author of this article is currently working as assistant to the editor of the journal *eisodos*. The impartiality was ensured by an external editor taking over the entire supervision of the review process.

¹ Seeck (1994) 97, by contrast, limits it to *rep.* 369b5–372d6, Gigon (1976) 137 to *rep.* 368c–374e, both without justification, and McKeen (2004) 70, compelled by her argumentation (see below), to *rep.* 370c–372d. Here, I move forward Rowe's limitation (2017) 57 n. 1 to *rep.* 369a–372d by two lines and expand it by what I consider to be the immediate opposite of the "City of Pigs" with the result, that my discussion of the "City of Pigs" refers to *rep.* 368e7–373e8 (count here and in the following according to Burnet (1962)).

² Cf. e.g. Gigon (1976), Höffe (2011). Convincingly rejected by Barney (2001).

³ Cf. McKeen (2004) ("worse"), cf. Barney (2001) ("parodic"), cf. Rowe (2017) ("better").

⁴ Cf. e.g. Adam (1902), Gigon (1976), Barney (2001), Höffe (2011), Schrieffl (2013).

⁵ Cf. e.g. Barney (2001), McKeen (2004), Seeck (1994), partly Cross / Woozley (1966).

⁶ Cf. Gigon (1976), Seeck (1994), McKeen (2004), Adam (1902); partly Cross / Woozley (1966). Barney (2001), Rowe (2017) on the other hand more differentiating.

⁷ E.g. McKeen (2004) 89f. referring to Glaucon's preliminaries toward the question of justice (*rep.* 357–362) and the Forms of Decay (book 8-9); Barney (2001) 218 with reference to the Theory of Soul of book 4-9 (and even to other dialogues of Plato (ibid. 221-5)); Rowe (2017) 67–70 argues on the basis of implicit allusions that unfold their full meaning only against the background of book 10.

another assessment, that is to Socrates' "exhortation" to the "City of Pigs", even if the interlocutors eventually turn it down on psychological grounds.

2. Summary and structural analysis of the dialogue's discourse in *rep.* 368e7–373e8

In order to provide foundation for my argumentation, I will present an overview of the passage and its context in a table chart. Next, I will analyse the discourse on the "City of Pigs" as well as the way it is embedded in that context.

368e7–369c11	(1) first origin: community
368e7–369b4	(0) state foundation in a dialogue for contemplation of justice ("State Analogy")
369b5–c8	(1a) lack of self-sufficiency (οὐκ αὐταρκής, πολλῶν ἐνδεής)
369c9–11	(1b) needs (χρεία)
369d1–372a4	(2a) first developmental description (necessary population sections)
369d1–e1	(I) most necessary population sections/needs (farmer, housebuilder, weaver)
369e2–370c6	(II) excursus: justification of the division of labour
370c7–371e8	(III) useful population sections/needs (craftsmen, shepherds, international, local merchants, and workers)
371e9–11	(IV) Socrates: "Is the state already complete?" Adeimantus: "Maybe?!"
371e12–13	(V) Socrates: "Where & whence (in-)justice?"
372a1–2	(VI) Adeimantus: "Somewhere in the dealings with each other?!"
372a3–4	(VII) Socrates: "Let's immediately examine it!" ⁸
372a5–d3	(3a) first situational description ("City of Pigs")
372a5–c1	(I) most necessary way of living
372c2–d3	(II) way of living with useful side dishes
372d4–e8	(4) abstraction
372d4–5	(I) Glaucon: "What would your 'City of Pigs' look like?"
372d6	(II) Socrates: "How else?!"
372d7–e1	(III) Glaucon: "What is commonly deemed necessary!"
372e2–8	(IV) Socrates' transition: "Accordingly, we no longer contemplate a healthy, true (4a), but luxurious, inflamed city (4b)"
373a1–b1	(3b) second situational description ("Luxurious City")
373a1–4	(I) luxurious furnishings, menu and similar pleasures
373a4–b1	(II) not-necessary painting, decoration and ornamentation
373b2–d3	(2b) second developmental description (not-necessary population sections)
373b2–c1	(IV) doctors
373c1–4	(II) various servants
373c4–8	(III) pig herdsmen
373d1–3	(IV) doctors
373d4–e3	(5) another origin: war
373d4–d8	(I) territorial shortage: expansion
373d9–e1	(II) greedy neighbours
373e2–8	(III) discovery of the origin of war

⁸ Cf. Rowe (2017) 58 n. 7. Cross / Woosley (1966) 84 and following them Krapinger (2017) 473, n. 68, by contrast, assume that this question is not resumed until *rep.* 432d. The difference, however, rather seems to be that what is there consciously reflected upon can not yet be dealt with here in any other way but metaphorically.

In the initial part (0) the interlocutors try to determine the nature of justice as part of the individual character. To attain this goal, Socrates proposes to examine the matter on the more conspicuous level of a state. His intention is to establish what it means for a state to be just, and to use the insights gained in this way for the inquiry into an individual person's justice. In the beginning, the *lack of self-sufficiency* (οὐκ αὐτάρκης, ἐνδεής) (1a) as well as the needs (χρεία) (1b) of each individual make up two causes⁹ why human beings gather in a community (1a) and systematically work on the satisfaction of their needs (1b). Based on the division of labour, they keep house with available resources, i. e. act economically. "[D]as darauf aufbauende System"¹⁰ is depicted, on the one hand (2a), as a quasi-evolutionary development of a hierarchy, according to which the respective population section responsible for satisfying a need have to be included in the thus increasing "State". On the other hand, embedded in (2), constant situations (3) shall demonstrate according to which abstract principle (i.e. how) humans in either system could and should cooperate with each other. Next, a woven-in discourse on principles (4) takes place during which Glaucon labels the situational state depicted first (3a) as a "City of Pigs". Socrates, by contrast, calls it a "true, healthy state" (4a), at the same time debasing Glaucon's vision as a "luxurious, inflamed state". Nevertheless, Socrates adjusts the consideration to this vision, henceforth using the label of (4b) as a guiding principle. Accordingly, he replenishes the first situational description (3a) with several items that befit this label, eventually making up the second constant state (3b). Not only must he add other population sections, but also extend the territory so that even the needs prevailing in this situation can be met. The path chosen in (4), however, soon encounters its limits: such uninhibited expansion is not available without accepting war (5), as well.

Indeed, as it seems, we nowhere face the sketch of an entire state, but rather of a (twofold) *economic*¹¹ system that is illustrated from *three* different perspectives. On the one hand, single needs—illustrated by population sections that take care of their satisfaction—are integrated into each system (2a–b) *as if* in an evolution. On the other hand, two concrete ways of living (3a–b) depict an economic system that meets the needs respectively. Thirdly, the interlocutors reflect upon and judge about both systems in the abstract (4a–b). Consequently, we might detect a chiasmic structure in this passage in the form of (2a) - (3a) - (4a) - (4b) - (3b) - (2b), the abstraction and assessment (4) being the turning point. What follows, albeit skillfully integrated into the dialogue, is

⁹ Cf. Seeck (1994) 104, he only takes (1b) as the "Grundprinzip", i.e. basic principle however, and now and then equates it indiscriminately with (1a). This however leaves unexplained why their gathering is necessary at all, if individuals have no need of others for this very reason, i.e. (1a).

¹⁰ Seeck (1994) 104, but now he distinguishes between origin and actual way of living – here (2a) & (3a) – (ibid. 100), now takes them together, explaining resulting discrepancies as intended by Plato (cf. esp. ibid. 103f. n. 9, 111).

¹¹ Cf. Seeck (1994) 111: "auf das rein Ökonomische reduzierte Staatsformen"; Cross / Woosley (1976) 78f., 83; Barney (2001) 211 n. 5, 212f.

a different subject matter, that is to say the contemplation of all aspects of the sketch of the State which is built upon this economic basis. E.g., the topic of war serves as a transition to considerations of military authority¹²—this, in turn, intertwined with a discourse on a twofold, intellectual and physical education—leads up to political power. Neither does the focus of these spheres matter already in our passage nor are these sections still preoccupied with the economic system.

3. The "City of Pigs" as an economic system: 5 hypotheses

For the time being, which insights can we gain from this textual analysis? (A) On a structural level, we might distinguish the description of a quasi-evolutionary development (2), depicting a *catalogue of needs* (*rep.* 369d1–371e11; 373b2–e3), from the description of two constant situations (3) that are embedded in (2) and both show the draft of an *economic system* (*rep.* 371e12–372d3; 373a1–b1).¹³ Furthermore, we encounter a reflection (on principles) (4) (*rep.* 372d4–372e8). The latter marks both peak and turning point of our chiastically structured dialogue passage. Here, Socrates and Glaucon reflect upon everything that has been treated so far, assess it, and thus set the direction for everything that is to follow. (B) This fact emphasizes that the "City of Pigs" is supposed to be compared exclusively with the "Luxurious City" insofar as both are economic systems. Only later further dimensions of the State are integrated - in other discourses, and other contexts, e.g. that of political power or education.¹⁴ (C) Even apart from this aspectual focus, the "City of Pigs" has to be located on a different level than the subsequent drafts, since all of them are mere snapshots within a systematic unfolding of an Ideal State in its entirety.¹⁵ This state is gradually specified in the course of the dialogue, but not finished before book 7.¹⁶ What is more, the process of

¹² Gigon (1976) esp. 137 holds that the introduction of the Guardians (*rep.* 373e9ff.) still belongs to the economic discourse of the "City of Pigs" and the "Luxurious City". However, this fails to recognize that the turning point in *rep.* 374d8–e9 merely leads from the Guardians' task (i.e. guarding over the city (*rep.* 373e9ff.); cf. *rep.* 374d8) to the interlocuters' task (i.e. the discourse on education (*rep.* 374e10ff.); cf. *rep.* 374e6). At this point, the whole preceding economic discourse is left aside. Therefore, *rep.* 373e2–8 seems to be a more plausible transition. For on the one hand, the discovery of the origin of war explicitly refers back to the preceding state draft, i.e. the economic system, and prepares, by hinting at future evils of war, both the inclusion of a Guardian Class, necessitating a widening and differentiation of society, as well as the focusing on education, that is on the physical and mental character formation. Consequently, a crucial change of levels within the State draft takes place here (cf. Cross / Woozley (1966) 90–95, Schrieffl (2013) 148–51). On the other hand, arranging it in this way avoids the difficulty of the share that the Guardians have in the misery of the "Luxurious City", particularly concerning the expansionist war (suspected by Gigon (1976) 175f., as well). According to Höffe (2011) 61 the Guardians of all people would permit the expansive infringements to the "begehrlich[e] Bürgerschaft", i.e. the longing citizenry.

¹³ Cf. Seeck (1994) 100–102. Similarly Cross / Woozley (1966) 85–87, 90–93.

¹⁴ Cf. Cross / Woozley (1966) 98–103, 110, Barney (2001) 213f. Differently Höffe (2011) 52f., 63–68 (although he himself stresses 55f. the exclusively "ökonomischen Anteil").

¹⁵ Barney (2001) 213 and McKeen (2004) 73 disregard the statement's form in *rep.* 371e9–11. Here, Socrates asks Adeimantus, whether the state is complete after (2a), he does not *maintain* it.

¹⁶ Seeck (1994) 102, Gigon (1976) 159–161, Höffe (2011) 53, Cross / Woozley (1976) 79, McKeen (2004) 79–81 explain, e.g., absent administrative authorities by putting the "City of Pigs" close to an alleged golden age without any necessity of control, guidance and conflict management. However, it seems more plausible to put this down to the *dialogue itself* as a means of communication, in which the State's

unfolding has to be logical-systematic,¹⁷ rather than historical, and its sporadically historical resemblance must not be equated with a claim to historicity.¹⁸ (D) To the extent that both “City of Pigs” and “Luxurious City” are merely aspect-focused subsystems, their inhabitants likewise do not figure as complete entities, but rather as metaphorical expressions. Only as the dialogue proceeds, both “City” and “Humans” are gradually put together.¹⁹ For instance, artistic potential and further cognitive skills of “humans” are not explored in more detail prior to the discourse on education; human intellect is not treated extensively and in its complexity prior to the Ideal State’s completion.²⁰ In (2a–b), by contrast, the population groups mentioned figure as mere personifications of single needs, whereas the communities in (3a–b) are supposed to illustrate how these needs might interact in a system. (E) We must be aware of the intention of Socrates’ State Analogy expressed in *rep.* 367e–369b. Accordingly, in our context the social perspective has primacy over the individual, a social theory over the Theory of Soul.²¹

foundation can be carried out only *gradually*. Thus, it is not the “humans”, but rather the *dialogue section itself* that is not yet concerned with this question, cf. Barney (2001) 213.

¹⁷ Going beyond Seeck (1994) 104, it can be observed not only within the *economic discourse* (here 2a–b), but also *transcending single discourses*. Barney’s criticism (2001) 217 against the idea of unfolding aims at an understanding that sets only the “City of Pigs” as the basis for this unfolding, but not the *whole economic discourse*.

¹⁸ Cf. Seeck (1994) 104, 111 and esp. 103: “Platons ‘Schweinestaat’ als theoretisches Modell und nicht als existenzfähige und gar historisch vorauszusetzende Staatsform”. “Schweine-” and “üppiger Staat” may be considered, in the context of the City’s foundation, as “Zuspitzungen von Wertmonopolen” (conceptually striking Frede (2011) 193–208, esp. 202, even if she applies it there to the Forms of Decay of the City of Philosophers in book 8–9), without thereby claiming any historicity. They have never existed, nor could they as an *entire* state. Hence, it would be implausible to interpret the “City of Pigs” as past, the “Luxurious City” as present and the “City of Philosophers” as future. Even if Gigon (1976) esp. 143 does not regard them as “Staatsganze”, he nevertheless falls victim to the historical appearance, since in his account the foundation of the City “(...) von der Urform des Staates überhaupt [i.e. “City of Pigs”] bis zum vollkommensten Staate [i.e. “City of Philosophers”] hinaufführt [presumably continuously]” (so apparently Höffe (2011) 52f., as well).

¹⁹ This responds to the difficulty Cross / Wozzley (1966) 84–6, 99f.; Barney (2001) 220f.; McKeen (2004) 78–81 are confronted with, when searching for an element that makes the “humans” of the “City of Pigs” self-controlled; it also provides an alternative solution to Höffe’s (2011) 67f. and Rowe’s (2017) 69f. searching for the θυμός, the spirited/desiring part in the soul of the “inhabitants” of the “City of Pigs”.

²⁰ E.g. Gigon (1976) 178f. presumes that the “inhabitants” of the “City of Pigs” were not “eudaimoniefähig”. More likely, however, seems that the *dialogue itself* is not familiar with the concept of εὐδαιμονία until *rep.* 419a. Likewise, both Adam (1902) 370a–b and Höffe’s (2011) 66 (self-confessed *ibid.* 69) speculative reading of the “komplex[e] Zuordnung” possibly see too much human inner life already present in the “City of Pigs”. The latter—albeit with various modifications—postulates already for this passage a triadic analogy of classes, forms of government and parts of the soul, thus problematically re-attributing later concepts and relations to a prior context. It seems, however, questionable, firstly to ask about the functioning of reason already here (so Höffe (2011) 65, Cross / Wozzley (1966) 84–6), secondly to consider the “Begehrlichkeit” (covetousness) as corrupting only if “Tatkraft” (drive) is added (cf. Höffe (2011) 67f.) and thirdly, in doing so, to neglect how and under which accentuation the dialogue actually proceeds from the first stage of the State (here “City of Pigs”) to the second (roughly “Luxurious City”). Although Gigon (1976) 162 acknowledges the character of development, he nevertheless equates inhabitants of the “City of Pigs” with the later 3. class of the *Kallipolis*. More differentiating Schriefl (2013) 10.

²¹ Cf. Höffe (2011) 51f. As Adam (1902) 368e correctly notes, the systematic re-transfer does not begin until book 4. However, even he understands this passage based on soul aspects as first and lowest city (Adam (1902) 372d–e), being an image of the desiring part of the soul, that he distinguishes from a second (*rep.* 2,372e–4) and third (*rep.* 5–7) Polis. To be sure, it is indeed a lack of development that

4. The "City of Pigs": a deficient "City of Philosophers"?

We shall now render these assumptions even more plausible, for – given such an understanding – far-reaching interpretive consequences would arise. To begin with, it seems erroneous to put the "City of Pigs" on the same stage of development as the "City of Philosophers". Consequently, it is inconclusive to take them as opposite state drafts²² supposed to be compared with one another on equal terms.²³ I shall now examine that the question should not read "Braucht der Mensch Philosophie oder lebt er besser ohne sie?",²⁴ but rather "According to which principles *should* and *could* they act economically?".²⁵ For even if, at first glance, it might seem attractive to apply the modern concept of a happy pig (as opposed to an unhappy Socrates) to the "City of Pigs" (as opposed to the "City of Philosophers"), this obviously misses Plato's intention in this passage. As stated above, each City and its "humans" appear in their own context on different levels and with distinct ranges, respectively differentiated from other concepts. For example, (a) *within the state foundation*, the "City of Philosophers" already comprises the features of all aforementioned states, i. e. an economic as well as an education system, a tripartite society, political power and, eventually, humans who are both physically and mentally complete; (b) *in contrast to the Forms of Decay*, though, this city stands out because of the primacy of philosophers or rather reason (λόγος) (on

this passage mainly deals with human needs. However, this lack does not apply to the *object* of contemplation, i. e., the "humans" or the community, but rather to the *contemplation itself*, i.e. the dialogue still being in its infancy. It would in fact be problematic to view these cities and their inhabitants in such individual-psychological terms as are introduced only at a later stage of the dialogue, viz. book 4. In other words, it would be inappropriate to stress a distinctively epithymetic note to these initial city drafts, because drawing on this concept related to the tripartition of the individual soul would still go beyond the conceptual horizon of the interlocutors' contemplation up to this point.

²² Seeck's argumentation (1994) 111 underestimates the "Luxurious City" (though being the actual counterpart in the comparison with the "City of Pigs"): "Eigentlich brauchte Platon nicht zusätzlich eine dritte Stufe, den Luxusstaat, einzuführen [...]".

²³ So Seeck (1994) 102f., though not specifying whether he was thinking of *any* or *the* City of Philosophers introduced by Plato as *Kallipolis* (our argumentation shall exclusively refer to the latter, synonymous to "City of Philosophers"). A foreboding of the principal incomparability of units such as SStaat[en]"with mere "Lebensform[en]" is to be found in Seeck's conclusion (1994) 111. McKeen (2004) esp. 70, 75–8, 92, (a) equally misses this ontological difference, when indiscriminately piling up "Micropolis" (*rep.* 369c–70c), "Hyopolis" (*rep.* 370c–2d), "Tryphosa Polis" (*rep.* 372d–5a) and finally "Kallipolis" (apparently everything up to book 7). Furthermore, (b) she applies a criterion for assessment to the first three Cities that does only befit the fourth's context: "civic unity" (McKeen (2004) 70; similarities already in Cross / Wozzley's "natural" and "artificial unity" (1966) 99f.). However, this disregards the context(s) relevant for each city: (c) starting off with book 2, primarily the construction of a city gradually takes place—up until arriving the Kallipolis as a complete entity. It is only there that the investigation focuses on a city's decline, thus also making unity a relevant, even decisive criterion. On the other hand, (d) these argumentations fail to take into consideration the "Luxurious City" as being the proper factor of comparison. Similarly, despite the same reservations, cross-comparing the *Kallipolis* with the "City of Pigs" Rowe (2017) 59–61, 69f. with the disturbing result of the "City of Pigs" being, on the whole, superior to the *Kallipolis*.

²⁴ Cf. Seeck (1994) 102f.

²⁵ Cf. Seeck (1994) 110 (basically also Cross/Wozzley (1966) 80, limited, *ibid.* 83) possibly too speculative in back-projecting modern economic concepts. The former even sees a conflict of market and planned economy at work.

sociopolitical or rather individual-psychological level).²⁶ The “City of Pigs”, by contrast, appears only *within the state construction*, and there at a completely different stage: figuring as a merely economical basis of the Ideal State,²⁷ it represents a system of moderated needs as opposed to the “Luxurious City” with its unleashed needs. Therefore, we would be mistaken, on the one hand, if we construed either an (in the strict sense) evolutionary or in general a chronological connection between both “Cities”. Neither diachronically nor synchronically can the inhabitants of the “City of Pigs” be inferior to the philosophers, as they represent essentially different entities that must not be compared beyond their respective context. This becomes even the more plausible, if, on the other hand, we note the *distinct functionality* of the imagery²⁸ at work. Accordingly, the “City of Pigs” and its inhabitants function merely as symbolic excerpts, supposed to illustrate certain aspects of the respective entity rather than representing it as a whole. In order to support this argument with an example, I shall now deconstruct an objection concerning artistry one might raise against this exclusively economical, purely functional reading of our passage. One could point out that artistry already seems present at least in the “Luxurious City” to a certain degree, taking this as an indication of civilizational progress from the “City of Pigs” to the “Luxurious City”. But clearly, the focus is not yet placed upon *artistic expression as such* as evidence of mankind’s reflected artistry. Rather, what seems crucial here is how these different kinds of artistic expression relate to the *necessary* and *useful*. For on the one hand, splendid ornamentation in the “Luxurious City” is ruled out *expressis verbis* as unnecessary as opposed to necessary housebuilding or production of clothes in the “City of Pigs” (*rep.* 373a4–8).²⁹ What is more, we might even spot artistry in the “City of Pigs” (*rep.* 372b7–8) too—insofar its religious forms that are unquestioningly included, obviously being considered as necessary. Hence, the mentioned art forms are ascribed either to the “City of Pigs” or the “Luxurious City” primarily according to their degree of necessity. This, however, does not imply any *causal* relation assigning a more advanced state of development to the latter (“being able to house not-necessary art, hence developed”), but, at the utmost, underscores a *correlation* of necessity and complexity (“the more refined, the less necessary”). On the other hand, poets do not appear as individual *mimetic artists* as such, but rather as one among other *social institutions*. They all have in common that they are dedicated to something that is not immediately necessary for the economic system, i.e., in case of the poets imitating its reality.³⁰ This is even more correct, if we bear in mind

²⁶ Cf. Frede (2011).

²⁷ Cf. Cross / Woozley (1966) 81f.

²⁸ Cf. McKeen (2004) 84f.

²⁹ Adam (1902) 373a, by contrast, implies that decorating art is supposed to play a role only after the satisfaction of basic needs - thus not prior to the “Luxurious City”, while neglecting the religious art already present in the “City of Pigs”.

³⁰ This, however, does not yet say anything about the moral value of their contents. Although McKeen (2004) 86 rightly stresses the notion of cleaning in *rep.* 399e, she overlooks, however, that only within the

that those, who merely build their work on that of the poets, are considered as mere servants, accomplices, being even less necessary (*rep.* 373b5–c1). We will come back to other population sections introduced in *rep.* 373b2–c8 (see below).

5. Status and function of these concrete situations: illustrative lifestyles

The preceding analysis and rejection of an "anti-philosophical" reading confirms that the specific context of the "City of Pigs" and the "Luxurious City" *mainly* (if not *exclusively*) deals with human needs. In the following, I shall elaborate on the precise functioning of this passage by having an even closer look at each concrete situation in the "City of Pigs" and in the "Luxurious City".

a. Status As the text itself puts it, we have to understand them most plausibly as ways of living (δίαίτια)—that is, concrete, immediately illustrative *lifestyles*. These lifestyles are intended to make come to life the abstract principles that, according to Glaucon's and Socrates' abstraction (4, see above), are inherent in either system (πόλις³¹). For an imagery of different diets might far more lucidly explain an order of needs or rather an economic system than a discussion of abstract terms could (see below).

b. Function For this reason, on the one hand, the δίαίτια-descriptions (3a–b) go beyond mere enumeration of single needs, as in the descriptions of *development* (2a–b). Instead, they create a *fiction* of how these needs might interact with each other if they come together experimentally in a community. On the other hand, they *prepare* for the subsequent abstraction (4), insofar as they equip the interlocutors with a metaphor or an idea, which they can think about and judge in the abstract.³² Besides, particularly the former situation provides Socrates with a concrete point of reference in contrast to which he can devise another situation even more perceptively instead of relying entirely on conceptual argumentation. Thus, the entire dialectical undertaking of this passage profits from his vivid imagery as well.

6. The "Schweinestaatsprinzip"

In fact, there are three aspects immanent in the *imagery of nutrition* that emphasize what the *actual content* of the "City of Pigs" consists of. Firstly, as it seems, a distinction is being made between *moderate* wine consumption at a *symposium* (in the "City of Pigs")

discourse on education artists are treated as *artists*, and that only from this vantage point they may be questioned about and selected according to their contents. All of this, though, does not yet apply to our passage.

³¹ Here, πόλις describes a subsystem of an entire city. This city is woven together during the dialogue and comes to existence only gradually (*cf. rep.* 367e7–369b4: esp. 369a5–7). However, this does not make this passage a course in economics, appearing independently for its own sake (*cf. Seock* (1994) 108). Instead, it figures as a discourse focused on economic aspects supposed to *serve as a basis* for the state draft as a whole (*cf. Cross/Woozley* (1966) 76f.).

³² *Cf. Adeimantus'* nothing but *vague* presentiment in *rep.* 372a1f. Obviously, some preliminaries and pedagogical sensitivity are required on Socrates' part, as he could not yet take a basic understanding of economic concepts for granted among his audience. The metaphor's effectiveness appears in Glaucon's objections, speaking in precisely these terms of "side dishes" and "feeding" (*rep.* 372d4; *cf.* 372c2–3, as well) (*cf. Barney* [2001] 213f.). *Cf. mutatis mutandis* the explanation of the utility of such images: *rep.* 443c.

as opposed to an order of short supply, in which wine merely figures as a *meagre side beverage*,³³ but also as opposed to an *overly luxurious setting* that outdoes the original purpose of a symposium.³⁴ Hence, the explicitly moderate wine consumption³⁵ obviously prevalent in the “City of Pigs” shows it to be an order of *utter restraint and modesty*³⁶, as opposed to a state of shortage or one of abundance. Thus, it seems to prefigure the *Principle of the Golden Mean*—directed at human needs. Secondly, the “mindset” of its “inhabitants” implies it even more clearly. For on the one hand, in order to survive they avoid of war and poverty (*rep.* 372c1). On the other hand, they do not strive for war and riches, either (*rep.* 373d7–e1), but rather lead a *life* in peace and health that lies in between and truly deserves its name (sc. βίος) (*rep.* 372d1–3). Thirdly, we come across a radical, therefore subtly presented thought introduced in three steps. To begin with, hunters are admitted at a crucial point (*rep.* 373b5) to the luxurious system, therefore as a population section concerned with something *un-necessary* and *im-moderate* (see above).³⁷ On the other hand, Socrates, in a meaningful pun with Glaucon, dwells on the Greek ὄψον (side dishes), exploiting this relatively open meaning.³⁸ Although, at

³³ Cf. ἐπι-πίνοντες, *rep.* 372b7. Adam (1902) 372b is probably right, that the wine follows. The main emphasis is presumably put on the priority-related lesser importance of an εμβελλισθημεντ rather than on the chronological one of a dessert. Likewise, the equable-moderate notion of ὑπο-πίνοντες in *rep.* 372d, i.e., wine consumption *being an end* in itself outreaches the chronological sequence of it being an *instrumental liquefactor of food*. Adam (1902) 372d mentions both aspects without weighting them.

³⁴ Cf. τᾶλλα σχεύη, *rep.* 372d7–373a4; esp. 373a2–4.

³⁵ Cf. μετρίως ὑπο-πίνοντες; *rep.* 372d1. Correspondingly, the genuine difference between “City of Pigs” and “Luxurious City” most probably refers to a contrast other than mere “Überleben” and “Gutleben” (Söder [2017] 52; similarly, Gigon [1976] 178f.), i.e. surviving vs. living well, and other than presence or absence of *Ännehmlichkeiten eines zivilisierten Lebens* (Höffe [2011] 52). To the contrary, already the “City of Pigs” itself contains both facets covered by the necessary, i.e. that which is *necessary to survive* and that which is additionally *helpful* (cf. *mutatis mutandis* the double role of the necessary within the discourse on desires in *rep.* 558d8–559c5).

³⁶ McKeen’s question (2004) 78f–80 (her own doubts 80, n. 22; similarly, Cross / Woozley (1966) 85f.; Gigon (1976) esp. 161; Höffe (2011) 55f.; Barney [2001] 220) about the specific *ability* that brings about autonomous self-control without any external authoritative control seems secondary here. In a *yet incomplete* “City” with *yet incomplete* “humans” Plato seems *yet* simply to take such a competence to distinguish between necessary and unnecessary needs already for granted. Therefore, the “City of Pigs” merely figures as an illustration of *the way it works*, the “Luxurious City”, conversely, as a depiction of its *absence*. The problem of this competence’s *nature*, however, can only be approached as soon as an enlarged apparatus of concepts of different city and soul parts is available to the discourse, hence at a later stage.

³⁷ Dissenting from Seeck (1994) 103, I see no discrepancy between mentioning fur processing (*rep.* 370e) *already* in the development of the “City of Pigs” and, by contrast, meat consumption *only* in the “Luxurious City”, clearly implied by mentioning hunters and pig herdsman. A possible explanation might be that the imagery of clothing exclusively predominates *there*, whereas *here* only that of nutrition. Therefore, fur-based clothes may, by implication, equally necessitate somebody capable of hunting. However, professional hunters dedicated to meat production, as obviously implied *here*, are admitted only to the “Luxurious City”, as in this very respect they satisfy the unnecessary desire for meat not yet prevalent in the “City of Pigs”. A similar argument seems to be applicable to Seeck’s second example for discrepancy, that of doctors. Their increased number serves as stylization of the respective “Wertmonopole” (see n. 19) *necessary-healthy* vs. *unnecessary-inflamed*. Presumably contrary to Gigon (1976) 165, this does not imply the complete absence of illnesses, but only that they are not systematically produced in the former state.

³⁸ LSJ s. v. ὄψον lists as the most common, unspecified meaning “cooked or otherwise prepared food, a made dish, eaten with bread and wine”. Socrates seems to take advantage of this openness both here

Glaucon's preceding complaint, Socrates includes cheese, fruits of trees and agricultural crops as side dishes in the nutrition plan, this apparently, however, is still not what Glaucon had expected (see below).³⁹ With this move, as it seems, Socrates deliberately intends to question the term ὄψον and the nuances of meaning unquestioningly associated with it. Presumably, Glaucon has had something in mind that goes beyond the notably vegetarian nutrition plan Socrates has just outlined. Now, if we link the point of the hunters' admission with this pun, Socrates obviously imagines the "City of Pigs" without any meat consumption. Thirdly, in the end, this idea is confirmed by the situation in which the pig herdsman (and their livestock) are introduced, only on top into the "Luxurious City" and supplied with the explicit statement that beforehand, there was *no need of them at all* (*rep.* 373c4–8). Therefore, we might say that in the "City of Pigs" of all cities, pigs neither end up on the inhabitants' plates (or whatever dinner service they might have used) nor do they occur altogether.

7. Socrates - a pig enthusiast?

Having now approximately determined the status and function of both situations as well as the core content of the "City of Pigs", it still remains to ask how the "City of Pigs" is evaluated in the text. In fact, this question yields three dimensioned answer: a *normative* one of moral obligation, a (supposedly) *pragmatic* one of feasibility regarding impediments of tradition, though essentially being a matter of *motivation-psychological* willingness.

a. "Do we ought to do this?" Regarding *normative obligations*, both Socrates and Glaucon pronounce a clear judgement containing their personal preference.⁴⁰ On the one hand, Glaucon adds a *pejorative* connotation to this City by introducing the term "City of Pigs". In addition, he considers it to be incompatible with traditional *customs*. Socrates, on the other hand, is truly bewildered by such an assessment (*rep.* 372d6). Hence, he insists on the opposite evaluation and puts forth another, so to speak, correcting term. Decidedly, he does not refer to it as a "City of Pigs", but rather as a "true state"⁴¹ and accordingly appends a *positive* connotation to it, also applying an imagery of health.⁴² He, on his part, is rather critical of its contrary state and stigmatizes it as a "Lu-

and in the discourse on desires in *rep.* 558d–9d, cf. Barney (2001) 213f. Krapinger (2017) 76f., 354, on the other hand, inconsistently blurring the parallel, when translating *here* "Zukost", in the discourse on desires, though as "Fleisch".

³⁹ Cf. Adam (1902) 372c; Barney (2001) 213f.

⁴⁰ Cf. Rowe (2017) 57–9; Barney (2001) 214.

⁴¹ Cf. ἡ ἀληθινὴ πόλις, *rep.* 372e6. Adam (1902) 372d comments correctly that the "City of Pigs" is full of irony, without therefore being entirely meant as a joke. Nevertheless, he is probably misled in insinuating (*ibid.*, 372e) that Socrates makes use of irony in his judgment ἀληθινή. As will appear later, the irony consists in both this positive judgement about the "City of Pigs" and the "Luxurious City"'s debasement being meant genuinely.

⁴² If understood as an "anti-philosophic" city (and granted that one does not dismiss the evaluation as parodistic right from the outset; cf. Barney [2001] 216f., 220f.), such a judgement uttered by the Platonic

xurious City”, equipped with a *negative* connotation of morbid inflammation.⁴³ Thus, Socrates creates a conceptual opposition of the “true, healthy city” applied to the former situation *in contrast* to the “luxurious, inflamed city” applied to the latter situation. Consequently, both Socrates’ judgement and the arrangement of the dialogue make the “City of Pigs” appear as the morally superior one. Why, then, do the interlocutors—Socrates being their leader—turn down the “City of Pigs” in favour of the “Luxurious City”?⁴⁴

b. “Are we able to do this?” At first glance, this may have to do with a lack of *viability* of the imagined city. For Glaucon points out that traditional customs⁴⁵, in his view, go against the way of living destined for the “City of Pigs”. Even if he hints at *contemporary* customs, this should not be more than *one* random example of unmoderated desires that has been *easily available* to him due to temporal proximity. There is no reason to surmise arrogance of modern men towards simple beginnings in it. In fact, Socrates, in his reaction, refers neither to anything contemporary nor tradition-based at all. Instead, what he goes into is a far more subtle trait, that finally unmasks Glaucon’s argument of viability as a mere pretext.

c. “After all, do we want this?” We might best understand Glaucon’s aversion by applying a new motivation-psychological reading of this passage. Especially telling are both his prototype reaction patterns and the conclusions Socrates draws from them. Altogether, Glaucon shows three reactions: (a) initially, he interrupts Socrates, incredulously pointing out the lack of side dishes. When he does not hearing what he clearly expects to hear, (b) he, in a mocking question, draws a comparison of the circumstances just described with a “City of Pigs” (*rep.* 372d4–5)⁴⁶ and (c) ascribes a desirable, not-miserable⁴⁷ living only to traditional conditions, featuring contemporary or similarly immoderate pleasure-seeking (see above), but obviously not to the “City of Pigs”.

Socrates has to be even more puzzling. He can only assess it in this way by talking about the economic basis of the State.

⁴³ Cf. φλεγμαίνουσα, *rep.* 372e8. Adamson (2012) episode 025 seems to apply this assessment incorrectly by claiming that Socrates distances himself from the instalment of guardians. He therefore even considers it as an apt defence against accusations of totalitarianism against Plato (cf. Frede [1996] 74–107). As should be clear by now, this misjudges the assessment’s range, which in fact solely regards the economic aspect.

⁴⁴ Cf. Rowe (2017) 64f., Barney (2001) 214, but respectively with different answers.

⁴⁵ Cf. ἄπερ νομίζεται, ἄπερ καὶ οἱ νῦν ἔχουσιν, *rep.* 372d–e.

⁴⁶ Contrary to one referee’s suggestion, I would still maintain that Glaucon and (for that matter) Socrates have in mind the entire situation just described when they give these labels, focusing on the paradigm of food. Thus, I would not understand Glaucon’s question as a merely hypothetical conditional clause that was to refer to a city entirely different from the one they are currently establishing. That I have been and keep referring to it with Glaucon’s term (to be found in all scholarship on this section) instead of Socrates’, is due to the former’s catchy nature. My use of quotation marks, however, shall highlight that it is *only* Glaucon’s term that cannot comprise the whole meaning and assessment attached to it (least that of Socrates, being the authoritative interlocutor).

⁴⁷ Cf. μὴ ταλαιπωρεῖσθαι, *rep.* 372d8.

With this in mind Glaucon's behaviour exemplifies an intuitive⁴⁸ aversion including (a) *disbelief*⁴⁹, (b) *scorn* and (c) serious *rejection*, as Socrates' proposal has shaken the foundations of his beliefs. *Superficially* he attributes his distress to the "City of Pigs" dissent from well-known tradition. The rejection, however, also expresses an *underlying* worry about a certain standard of living which he, Glaucon himself, obviously would not want to do without—notwithstanding that, as Socrates soon emphasises, sticking to this standard inevitably means bringing about wars (*rep.* 373d–e) in their State, as well. How, then, does Socrates handle such a reaction of Glaucon? *Prima facie* surprisingly subtle and inconspicuous—for something that he classifies as "true" and "healthy", should seem worthy of being defended more arduously. Closer examination, though, reveals an interesting process of understanding Socrates has to undergo. As a consequence of (a), he adopts—notably thankfully⁵⁰ for the reminder—those side dishes (a'), which seem to him necessary for a life in peace and good health (*rep.* 372c4–d3). To (b), by contrast, he reacts with utter disbelief on his part (b'), asking how else it ought to be (*rep.* 372d6). Finally, (c) evokes Socrates' most detailed and differentiated reaction (c') (*rep.* 372e2–8). It reflects his insight⁵¹ that Glaucon, standing in for others⁵², is bothered about—or rather has grown accustomed to—satisfying more needs than *actually* seem (at least to him, Socrates) necessary⁵³, sufficient⁵⁴ and healthy for the individual as well as the state. Nevertheless, in order to be able to continue the dialogue, he accepts somehow regretfully his interlocutor('s/s')⁵⁵ suggestion. For on the one hand, he seems to nourish the vague hope⁵⁶ that looking at the systematic production of (in)justice in the "Luxurious City" might bring them closer to the inquiry's aim, i.e., catching a glimpse

⁴⁸ Adam (1902) 372d correctly points out that in the dialogue's narrative, nobody would be more appropriate to express this discontent. For Glaucon is usually considered to be exceptionally spirited (cf. Barney (2001) 214). Yet, Adam's explanation (*ibid.*; similarly, Barney [2001] 220) that, by doing so, Glaucon distances himself from a life dedicated solely to one's desires, is not convincing. For in this context, he does not appear as a detached, down-to-earth observer from the philosopher's contemplative vantage point, but rather as the Glaucon who virtually feels involved and thus - overcome by his spirit - voices the reluctance he personally would feel towards such a system of need moderation. Consequently, his reluctance does not concern the (supposedly exclusive) focus on needs in the "City of Pigs", but rather the notion of *self-controlled moderation* (exactly the other way round cf. Barney (2001) 220). Though unforeseen, Höffe's speculations (2011) 67f. come true, that eventually, *θυμός* ("Tatkraft") causes the drastic change from the "City of Pigs" to the "Luxurious City"—though not *within* the State draft, in which "Tatkraft" abandons itself to "Begehrlichkeit". In fact, it is one of the interlocutors, i.e., Glaucon, considered as "tatkraftig", who raises this theme *on dialogue level*, thus including it into the whole discourse.

⁴⁹ Perhaps psychologically more comprehensible than disapproving sarcasm (so Adam [1902] 372c).

⁵⁰ Barney (2001) 216f., 221, by contrast, takes it as irony intended to provoke Glaucon by suspense.

⁵¹ Cf. *μανθάνω*, *rep.* 372e3.

⁵² Cf. *τισιν*, *rep.* 373a1.

⁵³ Cf. *τὰναγκαῖα*, *rep.* 373a5.

⁵⁴ Cf. *ἐξαρκέσει*, *rep.* 373a1.

⁵⁵ Cf. *βούλεσθε*, *rep.* 372e7.

⁵⁶ Cf. the expressions of uncertainty and supposition (*ἴσως, τάχ' ἂν κατίδοιμεν*; *rep.* 372e3–5) as well as the approximation *ex negativo* by *litotes* (*οὐδὲ κακῶς*; *rep.* 372e4).

of (the nature of) justice.⁵⁷ On the other hand, he can infer from Glaucon's intuitive aversion that the moderation of satisfaction of needs he has in mind would demand too much from most people.⁵⁸ Hence, albeit with regret, he has to pay heed to this fact⁵⁹ in the following—not, however, without having communicated his utter dissent. He even succeeds in attaining a certain sovereignty of interpretation for his judgement. For once he has uttered his preference for the “City of Pigs”, he immediately adapts the State draft to Glaucon's demands and continues the conversation, thus leaving no chance for the interlocutors to take offence at his appraisal. Consequently, although Socrates regards the “City of Pigs” and its moderation of needs as morally more valuable in terms of justice, even he must acknowledge its lack of universal feasibility among mankind on traditional, but especially motivation-psychological grounds.

8. Conclusion

In conclusion, regarding the “City of Pigs”, indeed, what we are dealing with is an image of simplicity—but not of mind, rather of a certain *lifestyle*. Thus, it does not figure as the epitome of naivety, but rather of *moderation and modesty*.⁶⁰ By leaving aside cognitive, political, and other realms, it does not represent a comprehensive state draft, but only its economic basis. The way of living depicted represents an economic system in terms of need satisfaction that is neither meagre nor exuberant. Rather, it is an order that strives for *sound moderation*, necessary and helpful desires being the guiding principle. To illustrate this, Socrates makes use of an imagery of *nutrition and health* that also recurs in later books, there being applied to the individual soul, while here figuring on an economic level.⁶¹ It is not for its moral unsuitability that the interlocutors eventually turn down the “City of Pigs”. On the contrary, it would be *too just* in two

⁵⁷ Actually, it is not the comprehensive, *innocent* justice of the “City of Pigs” itself that makes it unfitting to the investigation of justice (cf. Barney [2001] 214f.), but rather the higher perceptibility of the injustice systematically produced in its counter-draft.

⁵⁸ The moderation of need satisfaction negotiated *here* is, for the time being, supposed to concern *everyone*. In this very fact consists its supererogatory moment. Though being aware of the objection of supererogation, Barney (2001) 218–21 does not regard it as the genuine reason for rejecting the “City of Pigs” (ibid. 215f.), while neglecting that moderation *in the Kallipolis* is only required of *one section*, the characterly gifted guardians.

⁵⁹ Seeck (1994) 102 and partly Höffe (2011) 53 seem to be mistaken, when assuming *nostalgically* retrospective regret about a lost, allegedly golden age (cf. Barney (2001), rather than a sobering insight (however no “quick concession”, Barney [2001] 215). This insight of Socrates is about the fact that from his conception of man there would arise principally exorbitant demands on average citizens. He has to acknowledge once more that a moderation of need satisfaction does not *automatically* arise from each individual's psychic dispositions, but only indirectly through *internal and external control* via education and state authority. Nevertheless, he implements this moderation even more consequently when setting up the Guardians' education (cf. e.g., the discourse on nutrition in *rep.* 403e–404e and their way of housing and living in *rep.* 416d–420a).

⁶⁰ Seeck (1994) 102 considers the “City of Pigs” as “anspruchslos”, though erroneously in the sense of a low “geistig[es] und zivilisatorisch[es] Niveau”. Problematic in the same manner Adam (1902) 372b, who, by pointing at the modest diet, places it close to “primitive innocence of a pastoral community”.

⁶¹ The necessary, healthy, and eventually just might in this order be transferred to the respective paradigms only as soon as they are introduced into the dialogue (cf. with due contextual limitations in mind, the discourse on desires *rep.* 558d–559d and the definition of justice *rep.* 444d–e). The internalization, as

different respects: on the one hand, it may be easier to gain insight into the nature of justice indirectly / *e contrario*, by looking at a state that systematically yields injustice, i.e., the "Luxurious City".⁶² On the other hand, the system would be too just insofar as it imposes too high demands upon men's fragile capacity for need moderation. In fact, it does not actually work for everyone to lead a morally praiseworthy, modest and moderate life *out of one's own volition*, as Glaucon's prototypical protest highlights. In the end, the whole passage is a triumph of Socratic irony, as through Plato's staging it succeeds in deceiving Glaucon, the other interlocutors and entire reception traditions about the fact that here, Socrates has to be regarded as an enthusiast of pigs.⁶³ Yet, this must not be taken as a plea against philosophy - for it is Socrates, after all. Instead, as this peculiar picture itself implies, we might understand it best as Socrates' futile *plea for a moderate life, even in vegetarianism*.

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it were, or rather transference of the healthy to the state resp. individual soul (cf. Cross / Woosley [1966] 76–79, Höffe [2011]) is concluded (with all due limitations) only in the definition of justice (*rep.* 444d–e).

⁶² I.e., in an immoderate, covetous way of living (cf. Adam (1902) 372c, 373e; Barney [2001] 226f.), as originally proposed by Glaucon on the level of dialogue and then finding its way into the "Luxurious City".

⁶³ Cf. Seeck (1994) 97; a striking, puzzling, or even provocative image, that—despite its dubious interpretation to date—nevertheless keeps captivating attentive readership until today.

⁶⁴ Cf. footnote * at the beginning of this article for the measures undertaken to ensure the impartial editorial process of this article.

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BUCHREZENSION

Aniela Knoblich: *Antikenkonfigurationen in der deutschsprachigen Lyrik nach 1990*. Boston, de Gruyter 2014 (spectrum Literaturwissenschaft / spectrum Literature 44).

Johannes Groß

Die Komparatistin und Klassische Philologin Aniela Knoblich (K.) untersucht in ihrer 2014 erschienenen Dissertationsschrift dem Titel gemäß *Antikenkonfigurationen in der deutschsprachigen Lyrik nach 1990*. Da die Publikation dieses Buchs schon einige Jahre zurückliegt und bereits ausführliche Rezensionen erschienen sind,¹ sollen in dieser Besprechung nach einem kurzen Referat des von K. gewählten Textkorpus eine Aufbau- und Strukturskizze der Studie sowie einige Anregungen zur Weiterarbeit angeboten werden, um besonders Nachwuchswissenschaftlerinnen und -wissenschaftler anzusprechen.

Zunächst also zum Textkorpus: K. konzentriert sich auf die Werke der Autoren Thomas Kling, Durs Grünbein, Raoul Schrott sowie der Autorin Barbara Köhler. Alle vier genannten sind um 1960 geboren und können somit einer gemeinsamen Dichtergeneration zugerechnet werden. Gemeinsam ist ihnen auch, dass ihre Texte eine Vielzahl an Bezügen zur Antike aufweisen. Im Falle des 2005 verstorbenen Thomas Kling konnte K. bereits auf ein abgeschlossenes Werksganzes zurückgreifen,² während die Korpora der drei übrigen nach dem Zeitpunkt der Veröffentlichung noch Erweiterungen erfahren haben, wobei inzwischen auch Barbara Köhler verstorben ist. Köhlers Texte spielen in der Monographie insofern eine Sonderrolle, als sie lediglich an drei Stellen (Einleitung, Kap. II und Kap. V) behandelt werden.

Im Einzelnen werden die folgenden Texte untersucht (17):

Durs Grünbein: *Falten und Fallen, Galilei vermisßt Dantes Hölle und bleibt an den Maßen hängen, Nach den Satiren, Antike Dispositionen, Der Misanthrop auf Capri, Porzellan, Strophen für übermorgen*

Thomas Kling: *nacht.sicht.gerät, morsch, Das Haar der Berenice, Iterinar, Fernhandel, Botenstoffe, Sondagen, Auswertung der Flugdaten*

Barbara Köhler: *Niemands Frau*

¹ Elit (2016), Grimm (2016).

² Mittlerweile ist eine vierbändige Werkausgabe Klings erschienen: Kling (2020).

Raoul Schrott: *Hotels, Die Erde ist blau wie eine Orange, Die Erfindung der Poesie, Die Museen, Tropen, Weissbuch, Handbuch der Wolkenputzerei*

Grundsätzlich zerfällt der Aufbau in drei große Teile: Eine Einleitung (1–23), fünf Hauptkapitel (Kap. I, 24–66, Kap. II, 67–129, Kap. III, 130–194, Kap. IV, 195–268, Kap. V, 269–339) sowie ein Resümee (340–346).

Im Einleitungskapitel entwirft K. ein präzises Bild der deutschen Gegenwartsslyrik im Hinblick auf die Rezeption der Antike: Der in der Nachfolge der homerischen Odyssee „gestammelte[] Musenanruf“ (1) zu Beginn von Barbara Köhlers *Niemands Frau* dient als Problemaufriss und führt nach einem literaturhistorischen Überblick über die Antikenrezeption in der deutschen Gegenwartsslyrik (4–10) zur wesentlichen Forschungsfrage, auf welche Weise die benannte Autorin bzw. die drei Autoren deutscher Gegenwartsslyrik in ihren Texten auf literarische Konzepte der Antike rekurrieren, wie sie die älteren Texte nachahmen oder sich vielleicht auch dezidiert – in welcher Form auch immer – von ihnen abgrenzen. Als basal für diese Studie stellt K. die Frage nach der Art und Weise der Rezeption vor, die ihr wichtiger als die Frage nach ihrem Grund sei:

„Nicht das Warum ist für mich also die entscheidende Frage, sondern das Wie – dabei werden sich freilich auch mögliche Antworten auf die Frage nach dem Warum ergeben.“ (10)

K. entscheidet sich mit guten Gründen für einen thematisch gegliederten Zugang zum Textkorpus, da sie in einer autoren- bzw. werkspezifischen Herangehensweise die Gefahr von „Wiederholungen und Redundanzen“ (10) erkannt hat. Nach der Benennung der gewählten thematischen Fünfteilung (11–16) stellt K. das oben referierte Textkorpus vor (16 f.) und widmet sich „terminologische[n] Präliminarien“ (17–20), deren klare Begriffsdefinitionen insbesondere die Containerbegriffe ‚Antike‘ und ‚Rezeption‘ im Sinne der Arbeit zielführend erklären. Der (zum Erscheinungszeitpunkt) vollständige Forschungsstand (21–23) macht deutlich, dass K. zwar auf einige autorenspezifische Untersuchungen zurückgreifen kann, es an einer Gesamtdarstellung jedoch noch mangelt.³

Die fünf thematisch orientierten Kapitel (I–V) stellen das Herzstück der Studie dar. Im folgenden Abschnitt sollen daher die wichtigsten Fragen und Resultate referiert werden, um einerseits einen inhaltlichen Überblick zu erlangen und andererseits im Sinne von Schlaglichtern Anregungen zur Weiterarbeit zu geben.

Im ersten Kapitel steht unter der Überschrift „Quelle, Palimpsest und Ostrakon“ einerseits genuin antikes Material (‚Palimpsest‘, ‚Ostrakon‘) bzw. im Fall der ‚Quelle‘

³ Zu den Gedichten Klings ist in der Zwischenzeit der Sammelband Zymner / von Ammon (2019) erschienen, bezüglich Grünbeins *Nach den Satiren* der Aufsatz von Rubtsov (2018) sowie zu Köhlers *Niemands Frau* die Dissertation von Johnson (2016).

ein im übertragenen Sinne gebrauchtes poetisches Bild im Mittelpunkt der Untersuchung. Während der Begriff der ‚Quelle‘ als Metapher für den Einfluss eines Textes auf einen anderen unmittelbar verständlich ist und als ein großer Oberbegriff der Intertextualität aufgefasst werden kann, sind die Begriffe ‚Palimpsest‘ und ‚Ostrakon‘ der klassisch-philologischen Tradition entlehnt, wobei unter Palimpsest ein Pergament zu verstehen ist, welches nach der Abschabung des ursprünglich vorhandenen Textes erneut beschrieben worden ist, und ein Ostrakon eine Tonscherbe darstellt, auf der sich u. U. Geschriebenes befindet. Beide Begriffe bezeichnen im Kontext dieser Arbeit also Metaphern des Tilgens, des bruchstückhaft Vorhandenen und des Fragmentarischen. Besonders lohnend wird die metaphorische Qualität des antiken Materials für die Gegenwartsdichtung in der Untersuchung des Gedichts *Fundangaben* von Thomas Kling, wenn K. herausstellt, dass „[d]er Dichter [. . .] hier selbst die Klinge“ (38) sei, die Textschichten (im Sinne eines Palimpsestes) abschabe, um ältere Texte freizulegen und im Anschluss neu zu verarbeiten (ebd.). Hier berühren sich antike und moderne Lyrik auf gedanklich-materieller Ebene besonders eng. Die Ostraka-Metaphorik untersucht K. anhand einiger Texte von Grünbein, Schrott und Kling (38-66), wobei sie in diesem Zusammenhang auch andere Arten der Fragmentarisierung betrachtet wie z. B. die Zerlegungsmetaphorik in Klings Gedicht *Acteaon 3* im Zyklus *Fernhandel* (57-62).

Im zweiten Kapitel steht die Übersetzungstätigkeit der behandelten Dichter bzw. der Dichterin im Fokus. Übersetzungen bzw. Übertragungen antiker Literatur liegen in unterschiedlichem Ausmaß und mit unterschiedlicher Absicht in allen vier Fällen vor. K. untersucht u. a. beispielhaft Klings und Schrotts Catull-Übersetzungen, Köhlers Übersetzung des sapphischen Anaktoria-Fragments sowie die Übersetzung des senecaischen Thyest-Stoffs durch Grünbein. Dabei unterscheidet K. zwischen der dokumentarischen Übersetzung (in Nachfolge Wolfgang Schadewaldts) und der transponierenden Übersetzung, deren Theorie auf Emil Staiger zurückgeht (71-73).⁴ Nicht immer lassen sich die untersuchten Übersetzungen allerdings eindeutig einem der beiden Übersetzungstypen zuordnen, gerade z. B. die Texte Schrotts changieren aufgrund der Rollenunklarheit Schrotts als wissenschaftlich arbeitender Philologe bzw. als schöpferisch tätiger Dichter zwischen beiden Polen (128 f.) Aus diesem Kapitel ergeben sich allein durch die aus Platzgründen von K. nicht behandelten Gedichtübersetzungen zahlreiche Anregungen für Seminararbeiten oder Essays.

Im dritten Kapitel widmet sich K. der Frage nach der Rezeption antiker Formensprache, d. h. der Frage danach, wie z.B. Metrum, Strophenformen oder zyklisch gebaute Gedichtsammlungen in die moderne Lyrik übertragen werden. Es stellt sich heraus, dass Grünbeins Texte wesentlich durch einen Formzwang antiker Prägung beeinflusst werden, eine Haltung, die der Dichter selbst wiederholt reflektiert hat (vgl.

⁴ Überblicksdarstellung bei Kitzbichler / Lubitz / Mindt (2009) und dies. (Hgg.) (2009), zitiert nach Knoblich, 71, Anm. 8.

135–139). Die Analyse des Grünbein-Gedichts *In der Provinz 5* legt die verschiedenen Ebenen der Formrezeption frei, irritierend ist lediglich ein Hinweis auf einen Wikipedia-Artikel in einer Fußnote (145, Anm. 49). Die Lyrik Klings hingegen gehe freier mit den antiken Formen um und arbeite mit Dekonstruktion und Rekonstruktion der vorgefundenen Vorbilder. Besonders tieferschürfend ist in diesem Zusammenhang die Analyse des Gedichts *Actaeon 5* aus Klings Band *Fernhandel* (158–167), mittels derer K. wesentliche Züge der Poetologie Klings herauschält. Dieser Abschnitt zum Actaeon-Zyklus steht in enger gedanklicher Nähe zu dem ersten Großkapitel, in dem K. anhand von Klings *Actaeon 3* die Zerfleischung des in einen Hirsch verwandelten Actaeon poetologisch als „poetische Anverwandlung des Stoffes“ (58) ausdeutet. Als Weiterarbeit vorstellbar wäre hier etwa eine an K.s Forschungen angelehnte Analyse weiterer Gedichte des Actaeon-Zyklus. In einer solchen Analyse könnten Elemente des gedanklich verwandten ersten Kapitels aufgegriffen werden.

Das vierte Großkapitel behandelt „poetische Standortbestimmungen“, öffnet also die Frage nach literarischen bzw. tatsächlich besuchten Räumen und deren antiken Präfigurationen. So analysiert K. die Eröffnung literarischer und geographischer Räume in den behandelten Texten. Bereits in der Überschrift „Großstadt, Exil und Hotel“ werden drei typische Räume aufgerufen, in denen Dichtung situiert sein kann, im Falle von ‚Großstadt‘ und ‚Exil‘ sowohl in antiker als auch in moderner Literatur. Grünbeins Dichter-*persona* erfährt etwa im Gang durch das heutige Berlin eine moderne Dichterweihe, die in der Nachfolge Juvenals steht, während Thomas Klings Stadtgedichte sich eng an Catull anschließen. Die Texte beider eint, dass sie ‚Gedächtnisräume‘ (268) darstellen. Als Vertiefung dieses Kapitels wären Untersuchungen weiterer Gegenwartsgedichte hinsichtlich ihrer geographischen und literarischen Verortung lohnend, möglicherweise mit den von K. aufgeworfenen Fragestellungen nach den betretenen antiken oder modernen Räumen und deren Verzahnung untereinander.

Im fünften Großkapitel geht K. der Frage nach, welche aus der Antike überlieferten Dichterbilder die untersuchten Autoren bzw. die Autorin konstruieren. Hier steht die Außenwahrnehmung von Kling, Schrott und Grünbein als *poetae docti* im Gegensatz zur deutlichen Ablehnung dieses Titels durch die Autoren selbst. Auch die Zuschreibung des eher gegensätzlich aufgefassten *Poeta-vates*-Ideals erweist sich als nicht tragfähig. Zum Weiterdenken laden in diesem Kapitel zwei Aspekte ein: Einerseits das von Grünbein selbst geschaffene Dichterideal des *poeta empiricus* (321–326), dessen Tragweite für das Werk Grünbeins bislang vielleicht noch nicht erschöpfend untersucht wurde. Andererseits ist es die Perspektive Barbara Köhlers, der – obgleich ihre Dichtung an gelehrten Verweisen reich ist – von der Fachwelt interessanterweise gerade nicht das Prädikat einer *poeta docta* zugesprochen wurde. Das mag, wie K. herausstellt (337), an den wenigen antiken Vorbildern für dichtende Frauen liegen. Durch weitere interdisziplinäre Forschungen im Grenzbereich von Philologie, Komparatistik und Gen-

derforschung könnte dieser Aspekt aber sicherlich vertieft untersucht werden. Stefan Elit weist darauf hin, dass die Bezeichnung als *poetrix docta* möglich wäre.⁵ Im Anschluss an die Berufsbezeichnung, die Ovid der Dichterin Sappho in den Mund legte, könnte der Begriff der *poetria docta* entgegengesetzt werden.⁶ Unter Umständen können weitere Forschungsarbeiten den Kreis dieser modernen *poetriae doctae* erweitern.

Das abschließende Resümee (340–346) reflektiert die vorangegangenen Ergebnisse gründlich und bietet ein gehaltvolles Fazit.

Zum Anhang: Der Band ist durch ein Personenregister (377–382) erschlossen, welches allerdings nicht im Inhaltsverzeichnis aufgeführt ist. Die verwendete Literatur ist nach antiken Quellen (349f.), neueren Quellen (350–354), Interviews (354–356) und Forschungsarbeiten (356–375) gegliedert. Ein Stellenindex der antiken Quellen würde die Weiterarbeit auf klassisch-philologischer Seite etwas erleichtern, weisen die untersuchten Texte doch auf eine Dichterin (Sappho) und zehn Dichter der Antike (Archilochos, Catull, Homer, Horaz, Juvenal, Ovid, Platon, Seneca d. J. und Vergil) zurück.

In der Summe liegt hier eine gelungene und hervorragend redigierte Rezeptionsstudie vor, die das zum Teil undurchdringlich erscheinende Dickicht der durch die Lyrik der Gegenwart aufgerufenen Diskurse ein wenig lichtet und so wichtige Rezeptionslinien anhand klar umrissener Kriterien deutlich nachzeichnen kann. Neben den sprachlich wie inhaltlich ausgezeichneten Einzelanalysen, deren Prägnanz durchweg überzeugt, lässt die Gesamtanlage dieser Dissertationsschrift die Lektüre zu einem lehr- und anregungsreichen Vergnügen werden, das Lust sowohl auf aktuelle als auch auf antike Poesie macht und auf jeder Seite große Freude an der Arbeit mit Texten vermittelt.

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⁵ Vgl. Elit (2016) 435.

⁶ Vgl. Ov. her. 15, 183: *Grata lyram posui tibi, Phoebe, poetria Sappho: / convenit illa mihi, convenit illa tibi.*

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